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The Prosecutor's Right to Object to a
Defendant's Abuse of Peremptory
Challenges
I. Introduction
For more than 600 years of Anglo-American jurisprudence the
ability to peremptorily challenge prospective jurors has been a sacro-
sanct right of prosecutors and defendants.' One year ago in Batson
v. Kentucky,2 the Supreme Court devised a far-reaching test to pre-
vent prosecutors from abusing peremptory challenges by excluding
jurors solely on the basis of race. The decision was the Court's first
deep inroad into the heretofore unquestioned use of the prosecutor's
peremptory challenge.3 Although the Court limited its holding to the
defendant's right to object to a prosecutor's abuse of peremptory
challenges, Batson begs the question of whether its limitation should
be extended to a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges."
The defendant's use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors
on the basis of race, though left unaddressed by the Supreme Court,
is a contemporary problem. In the greatly publicized Howard Beach
murder trial in New York City, prosecutors objected when defense
attorneys purportedly used peremptory challenges to exclude three
prospective black jurors on the basis of their race.' The trial court, in
what was the first decision of its kind in New York state, held that
the defendants had improperly used their peremptories6 and explic-
1. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965). The peremptory challenge has been
the subject of abuse for an equally long time. See J. M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCE-
DURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT To REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 147 (1977) [hereinafter
VAN DYKE].
2. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
3. Although the Supreme Court addressed the issue of peremptory abuse to exclude
blacks in Swain, the Swain test placed an insurmountable burden of proof upon the defendant
who attempted to make a prima facie equal protection case. Thus, Swain effectively insulated
the peremptory challenge from judicial review. See Comment, The Defendant's Right to Ob-
ject to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1770, 1770-71
(1979).
4. Recently, at least one state's lower courts have chosen to extend Batson to apply to a
defendant's use of peremptories. See Howard Beach: Selection of Jury is Found Biased, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at Al, col. 1; People v. Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d 1081, 526 N.Y.S.2d 986
(1988).
5. Howard Beach: Selection of Jury is Found Biased, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22 1987, at
AI, col. 1. See also Must a Jury of One's Peers Be a Panel of One's Race? N.Y. Times, Sept.
20, 1987, § 4 (Week in Review), at 6, col. 4.
6. Howard Beach: Selection of Jury is Found Biased, supra note 4, at Al, col. 1.
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itly expanded Batson to defendants as well as prosecutors.'
Only the high courts of California, 8 Massachusetts,9 and Flor-
ida10 have addressed the issue of whether a defendant may use per-
emptories to exclude venire members on the basis of race. These
courts grounded their decisions on federal and state constitutional
guarantees to a jury selected from a representative cross-section of
the community." In light of Batson, however, many courts are likely
to face the issue of defendants' peremptory abuse.
In the aftermath of Batson, two pivotal questions emerge. First,
does the United States Constitution grant a prosecutor the right to
object to the defense attorney's use of peremptories to exclude a pro-
spective juror on the basis of race? Second, if the Constitution does
provide the prosecutor with such a right, is it found under the sixth
and fourteenth amendments' guarantee of a fair and impartial jury
or is the right based upon the fourteenth amendment's equal protec-
tion clause?
This comment addresses why application of the sixth amend-
ment's "representative cross-section" requirement to petit jury selec-
tion is inappropriate for curbing a defendant's use of peremptories to
exclude prospective black jurors. It proposes that, in the aftermath
of Batson, courts should use an equal protection approach to limit a
defendant's abuse of peremptories on the basis of race, despite the
significant hurdles of the fourteenth amendment's "state action" and
standing requirements.
II. The Role of the Peremptory Challenge in Criminal Trials
A. Jury Selection Procedure
Generally, the jury for a criminal trial is composed in three
stages.12 The first stage is the creation of a master list of prospective
7. id.
8. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
9. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881
(1979).
10. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
I1. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (use of
peremptory challenges by defendant or prosecutor to remove prospective jurors solely on the
basis of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross
section of the community as guaranteed by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution);
Soares, 377 Mass. at -, 387 N.E.2d at 516 (peremptory abuse violates article I of the
Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution); Neil, 457 So. 2d at 486 (use of
peremptory challenges to exclude black persons on the basis of race violates article 1, section
16 of the Florida Constitution).
12. See generally VAN DYKE, supra note i, at 85-175 (1977). A summary of Califor-
nia's jury selection procedures is found in Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 272-74, 583 P.2d at 758-59,
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jurors." Typically, county jury commissioners prepare the list from
existing juror lists, voter registration lists, tax assessor lists, city di-
rectories, and telephone books.' 4 The sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments mandate that selection for the master list have the goal of
creating "a fair cross-section of the community."' 6 In the second
stage of jury selection, court personnel excuse from service those pro-
spective jurors who are statutorily disqualified by reason of incompe-
tence, recent prior jury service, employment in specific professions or
hardship."
Once the case is called to trial and the pool of prospective ju-
rors, called the venire, is assembled, the final stage of jury selection
occurs. This stage is the voir dire,17 in which the parties may ques-
tion jurors and then challenge them on the basis of individual or
group bias.' 8 The selection procedure exercised at this stage of the
proceedings is different in kind from the creation of the master list,
in that it involves a negative means of selection. Whereas the goal of
the master list is to create a pool of eligible jurors representative of a
"fair cross-section of the community,"19 the purpose of the challenge
stage is to eliminate prospective jurors who the parties believe may
have bias against the defendant or the prosecution and who therefore
threaten the impartiality of the jury. 0
The challenges afforded to the prosecutor and defendant during
148 Cal. Rptr. at 900-01.
13. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 85-109. In Pennsylvania, creation of the master list of
prospective jurors is governed by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4521 (Purdon & Supp. 1985).
14. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 87. In Pennsylvania, a jury selection committee annu-
ally compiles a master list of prospective jurors from the voter registration lists for the county
or from some other list that will provide an equal number of prospective jurors. In addition,
the commission may supplement the master list with names drawn from: telephone, city or
municipal directories; tax assessment lists; lists of participants in any federal, state, county or
local program; school census lists; and a list of other persons who apply to the commission to
be included on the master list of prospective jurors. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4521.
15. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
16. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING To TRIAL BY JURY Standard 2.1 (1968). In Pennsylvania, exemption from jury duty is
governed by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4503 (Purdon Supp. 1987), authorizing jury commis-
sioners to excuse persons from jury duty for actively serving in the armed forces, serving on a
jury within the previous three years, or demonstrating to the court that jury service will cause
undue hardship or extreme inconvenience.
17. Voir dire, from the Law French, literally means "to speak the truth." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1412 (5th ed. 1979). It is the preliminary examination of prospective jurors, con-
ducted by the judge or by counsel, to determine a prospective juror's competency and absence
of interest in the case. Id. See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965) (describ-
ing American voir dire as "extensive and probing, operating as a predicate for the exercise of
peremptories").
18. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 139-40.
19. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527.
20. VAN DYKE, supra note I, at 139-40.
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the third stage of jury selection are of two types: challenges for cause
and peremptory challenges.' Their scope is typically defined by stat-
ute.2" A party may exercise an unlimited number of challenges for
cause, but the judge must approve of the exclusion.' Generally, a
court will sustain a challenge for cause in two situations. First, a
court will sustain a challenge for cause when the prospective juror
has shown by his answers during voir dire that he is incapable of
being an impartial juror.' Second, it will do so when, regardless of
the venire member's answers, the court presumes a likelihood of bias
on the part of the juror because of a familial, social or financial rela-
tionship with a party to the case.'
A party may exercise the second type of challenge, the peremp-
tory, "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being
subject to the court's control.' 6 Typically, the number of perempto-
ries afforded each party is limited by jurisdictional rules of civil
procedure.'
7
B. Historical Importance of the Peremptory Challenge
The historical roots of the peremptory challenge demonstrate
the importance of this right to defendants.' Blackstone viewed the
21. Id. at 139.
22. Cf People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 273-74, 583 P.2d at 759, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 900-
01. In Pennsylvania, however, the statute merely incorporates the common law grounds for
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4503 (Purdon &
Supp. 1987). Section 4503 states, "This subchapter shall not affect the existing practice with
respect to peremptory challenges and challenges for cause." id. See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 4526(f) (Purdon 1981); PA. R. CRIM. P. 1126.
.23. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 140.
24. Commonwealth v. Stamm, 286 Pa. Super. 409, 415, 429 A.2d 4, 7 (1981).
25. Id. at 416, 429 A.2d at 7.
26. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). While this definition remains true in
most circumstances, the Supreme Court has given the trial court some control over the prose-
cutor's abuse of peremptory challenges when black prospective jurors are excluded because of
their race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
27. For example, Pennsylvania affords both sides five peremptory challenges in misde-
meanor trials, seven in noncapital felony trials, and twenty in capital trials. PA. R. CRIM. P.
1126. In the federal courts, each side is entitled to twenty peremptory challenges in capital
cases. If the offense is punishable by more than a year in prison, the government is allowed six
peremptories and the defendant ten. For crimes punishable by less than one year, each side
receives three peremptory challenges. FED. R. CIm. P. 24(b). When there is more than one
defendant, the number of peremptories for both sides may be adjusted. See PA. R. CRIM. P.
1126(b) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
28. Blackstone set forth two reasons the peremptory was essential to the defendant.
First, the necessity that a defendant, especially in the capital trials, have confidence in his jury
requires that the defendant have the power to exclude a prospective juror based "upon sudden
impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and
gestures of another." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 346-47 (1769). Second, the defend-
ant may provoke resentment in a juror by vigorous questioning during the voir dire. While
such an objection to a juror may not rise to the level of a challenge for cause, Blackstone
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peremptory as a right granted essentially to benefit the defendant.2 9
He called it "a provision full of the tenderness and humanity to pris-
oners, for which our English laws are famous."30 At common law,
the defendant received 35 peremptory challenges.31 The Crown, how-
ever, by means of a procedure known as "standing aside," could ex-
clude an unlimited number of jurors."2
In colonial and early United States history, citizens' distrust of
a powerful central government manifested opposition to the prosecu-
tor's right to "stand aside" jurors."3 In United States v. Shackel-
ford,"' the Supreme Court held that the English practice of "stand-
ing aside" was not required practice in the federal courts. Unless the
state granted the prosecutor the right to peremptory challenges, the
prosecutor in federal court had none."'
With regard to the defendant, however, Congress recognized the
importance of peremptories. In 1790, it granted thirty-five challenges
without cause to persons on trial for treason and twenty to those
charged with other specified capital crimes.36 Although this law
made no provision for the prosecutor to exercise peremptories s7 most
states had statutorily granted peremptories for the prosecution by
the mid-nineteenth century.38
C. The Practical Importance of the Peremptory in Criminal Trials
The purpose of the peremptory challenge is "not only to elimi-
believed the exclusion of such jurors necessary to ensure impartiality of the jury. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 346.
31. Id. at 347. In England, the number of peremptories allowed to the defendant was
reduced to 20 in 1530 and now is set at seven. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 147-48.
32. At early common law, the Crown could exercise an unlimited number of peremptory
challenges. Recognizing the potential of such a practice for prosecutorial abuse, the English
Parliament passed a law in 1305 that limited the prosecutor to challenges for cause. English
judges, however, essentially preserved an unlimited number of peremptories for the Crown by
creating a procedure known as "standing aside." Under this procedure, the Crown could make
a challenge for "cause," but the court did not require the prosecutor to state the reasons for
the challenge at the time it was made. Only in unusual circumstances in which the jury selec-
tion process failed to yield twelve jurors was the prosecutor asked to state the reasons for the
challenges against prospective jurors who had been stood aside. See Ordin. de Inquis., 33 Edw.
I, ch. 4 (1305) (repealed 1825); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 347; VAN DYKE, supra
note 1, at 146-48.
33. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 148-49. New York did not allow the prosecution any
peremptory challenges until 1881. Virginia finally granted peremptory challenges to the prose-
cution in 1919. Id. at 149 n.46.
34. 59 U.S. 588 (1856).
35. Id. at 590.
36. 1 Stat. 119, ch. IX § 30 (1790).
37. Id.
38. VAN DYKE, supra note I, at 150.
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nate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties
that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis
of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise."39 Many at-
torneys believe that trials may be won or lost by strategic use of
peremptories.40 One study has concluded that jury verdicts are seri-
ously affected by the exercise of peremptories and that indeed law-
yers sometimes win their cases in the voir dire stage of
proceedings.4
Lawyers, recognizing the peremptory's influence on the outcome
of trials, have employed various means in deciding when to exercise
the exclusion. While some lawyers rely on instinct, others have em-
ployed persons of various skills, ranging from pollsters to psychics, to
advise them during the voir dire,42 with varying results.43 Besides the
premise of individual bias, the decisions to exercise peremptories
have been based on the belief that certain groups will view one side
of the case unfavorably. The groups have been defined in various
ways: by education,44 by the magazines they read," and by political
opinion.""
Prosecutors and defendants also have employed the peremptory
to exclude persons on the basis of race. Prior to Batson, the Supreme
39. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
40. VAN DYKE, supra note I, at 139.
41. H. Zeisel and S.S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and
Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L REV. 491, 518-19 (1978).
The authors of this article studied twelve federal criminal trials in order to determine whether
the parties' exclusion of jurors by peremptory challenges had an impact on the verdict. The
study also concluded that attorneys' "correctness" in exercising peremptories varied greatly,
but that the voir dire was occasionally decisive. Id. at 528-29.
42. In the 1975 Joan Little murder trial in North Carolina, the defense team employed,
for jury-selection purposes, sociologist Jay Schulman, an expert on social science jury selection
techniques, and Richard Christy, a social psychologist then at Columbia University. The team
also employed a "body language" expert and an astrologer-psychic. The astrologer received
$3,000 for his contribution to jury selection. Little was a young black woman accused of fa-
tally stabbing her jailer eleven times with an ice pick. Her plea was self-defense - that she
had killed the jailer when he tried to force her to have oral sex. The jury acquitted her after
deliberating only seventy-eight minutes. E. Tivnan, Jury By Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1975,
§ 6 (Magazine) at 30 [hereinafter Tivnan].
43. One surprisingly unsuccessful result occurred in the 1971 Harrisburg Seven trial in
which a group of Vietnam Conflict protestors faced federal conspiracy charges. Defense law-
yers did not exclude one woman because she had four sons who were conscientious objectors.
Ironically, the woman was one of two members of the jury who held out for conviction and
hung the jury. Tivnan, supra note 42, at 30.
44. During the trial of former United States Attorney General John Mitchell, defense
attorneys employed peremptories to exclude all persons with a college education from the jury.
VAN DYKE, supra note I, at 155.
45. In the Joan Little trial, the defense team's research indicated that prospective jurors'
choice of magazine subscriptions was the strongest indicator of whether the juror would favor
the defendant's case. See Tivnan, supra note 42, at 30. See supra note 42.
46. See Tivnan, supra note 42, at 30.
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Court had found no constitutional limitation on such use. 7 In fact,
the Court's opinion in Swain v. Alabama48 effectively precluded any
attack on peremptory abuse based on the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution.
Swain marked the first time the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether the Constitution precluded the use of peremptories
to exclude blacks from a jury. An all-white jury had convicted the
black defendant in Swain of raping a white woman, and the defend-
ant was sentenced to death .4 During jury selection the prosecutor
had used peremptory challenges to strike all six blacks from the jury
pool." Furthermore, the defendant showed that no black had served
on a jury in the county where the case was tried for at least 15
years, although the average jury pool included approximately six
blacks.5 1 The Supreme Court held that a defendant could not over-
come the presumption that the prosecutor had used his peremptories
properly based on evidence from a single case.82 In dicta, it recog-
nized that if a defendant could show that under every circumstance
the prosecutor had consistently excluded blacks from juries in case
after case, the defendant could meet the burden of proof." The
Court found, however, that the defendant's evidence over 15 years
was insufficient to meet this extremely high burden."
III. State Approaches to the Defendant's Abuse of Peremptories
The burden of proof that Swain placed upon defendants virtu-
ally precluded an equal protection-based challenge to peremptory
abuse. State courts, recognizing the obvious injustice to a black de-
fendant when he was tried by a jury from which blacks had been
excluded, sought other means of correcting peremptory abuse. These
state courts found a potential basis for limiting such abuse in Taylor
v. Louisiana.5
The Supreme Court in Taylor held that the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause incorporates the sixth amendment guarantee
that an accused has the right to a jury drawn from a fair cross sec-
47. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 203.
50. Id. at 205, 210.
51. Id. at 205.
52. Id. at 221-22.
53. Id. at 223-24.
54. Id. at 226.
55. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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tion of the community.56 California,5" Massachusetts,"5 and Florida"
have adopted the representative cross section requirement as a ra-
tionale to allow the prosecutor to object to a defendant's abuse of
peremptories.
Basically, these states have extended a reciprocal right to the
prosecutor to object to peremptory misuse, with justification of the
right arising in part out of the limitation these courts have imposed
on prosecutorial abuse of peremptories. These courts apparently de-
rive this right out of a concept of fair play. For example, in Com-
monwealth v. Soares60 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that the Commonwealth, by peremptorily excluding twelve of
thirteen eligible black jurors because of their race, violated the black
defendants' right to "a petit jury that is as near an approximation of
the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random
draw permits." 1 In a footnote, the court made note of the "Com-
monwealth's interest in prosecutions that are 'tried before the tribu-
nal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair
result.' "62 Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Neil 3
briefly summarized its rationale for extending to prosecutors the
right to object: "The state, no less than the defendant, is entitled to
an impartial jury." '64 California, in People v. Wheeler,65 provided a
56. Id. at 538. In Taylor, the defendant had been convicted by a jury in Louisiana state
court of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to death. The Louisiana jury selection system
provided that women were not eligible for jury service unless they had filed a written declara-
tion of their desire to serve. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's constitutional guar-
antee of "the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community,"
id. at 528, mandated that "women cannot be systematically excluded from jury panels from
which petit juries are drawn." Id. at 533.
57. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 764, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 906 (1978) (stating that the government has no less a right than the defendant "to a trial
by an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community"). The
Wheeler dicta has not yet been tested in the California appellate courts. Cf. People v. Trevino,
39 Cal. 3d 667, 683 n.10, 704 P.2d 719, 726, 217 Cal. Rptr. 652, 649 (1985).
58. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, - n.35, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517
(1979), in which the court stated, "We deem the Commonwealth equally to be entitled to a
representative jury, unimpaired by improper exercise of peremptory challenges by the de-
fense." The court also noted that if the black defendant, as contended by the Commonwealth,
had attempted to exclude peremptorily all prospective jurors of Italian descent from the jury,
such a practice would have been prohibited under their new rule. Id.
59. See State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1984) ("The state, no less than the
defendant, is entitled to an impartial jury.") Cf. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at
765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
60. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
61. Id. at - , 387 N.E.2d at 516 (quoting Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at
762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903).
62. Id. at -, 387 N.E.2d at 517 n.35 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24,
36 (1965)).
63. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
64. Id. at 487.
65. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
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similar abbreviated justification for the prosecutor's reciprocal right
of objection. 6
Massachusetts' appellate courts have applied the prohibition
against defendants' abuse of peremptory challenges on at least two
occasions." In Commonwealth v. Reed,6 8 the defendant, a woman
charged with murdering a man, raised peremptory challenges to ex-
clude from the jury the first six male prospective jurors who were
summoned.69 The prosecutor asked the judge to require the defend-
ant to explain her use of the challenges.7 0 The judge, expressly rely-
ing on Soares, found that the defendant had used her peremptories
to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of their sex and asked the
defense counsel to explain the challenges.7 When counsel refused to
offer an explanation, the judge disallowed the challenges and the six
men were installed on the jury. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that the trial court had acted prop-
erly.7" The court stated that the defendant's right to exercise per-
emptories was only a statutory right, and that the trial court, by
disallowing the challenges, had not infringed on the defendant's con-
stitutional rights.74
White defendants in Commonwealth v. DiMatteo75 attempted
to peremptorily exclude from the jury the sole black member of the
jury venire.7  The prosecutor, who was black, 77 objected, noting that
with the exception of her race, the prospective juror's background
66. Id. at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
67. For a third and unique case discussing peremptory abuse by defendants, see Com-
monwealth v. Whitehead, 379 Mass. 640, 400 N.E.2d 821 (1980). In Whitehead, one female
co-defendant complained that her female co-defendant had unconstitutionally excluded female
prospective jurors by means of peremptory challenges in a trial for female-to-female rape. The
court held that "it would be a perverse misuse of the doctrine" barring peremptory challenges
to exclude jurors on the basis of sex to overturn the appellant's conviction when the appellant
had failed to object at trial to her co-defendant's acts and when the peremptory abuse provided
the appellant with the same supposed advantage as the purported violator. Id. at -, 400
N.E.2d at 828.
68. 384 Mass. 247, 424 N.E.2d 495 (1981).




73. Id. at -. 424 N.E.2d at 500. The deferential standard used by the Supreme Judi-
cial Court indicates that the scope of review it applied to the trial court's decision was "abuse
of discretion."
74. Id. at - , 424 N.E.2d at 499. Further authority that the peremptory challenge is
not a constitutional right is found in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (citing
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
75. 12 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 427 N.E.2d 754 (1981).
76. Id. at -' 427 N.E.2d at 757.
77. Id. at -, 427 N.E.2d at 758.
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was similar to that of the other jurors against whom the defendant's
counsel had raised no objections."8 The trial court rejected as mere
pretexts the reasons proffered by defense counsel, who claimed that
he had excluded the juror because she was a widow and because of
the way she looked at the defendant.7 9 The appellate court found
that given the circumstances of the voir dire - white defendants, a
black prosecutor, and a single black venireman - the judge could
have concluded that the defendant had improperly exercised a pe-
remptory challenge, even though there was no "pattern of
conduct."80
The Massachusetts, California, and Florida courts derived the
prosecutor's right to challenge a defendant's use of peremptories
from their initial holdings allowing a defendant to object to the pros-
ecutor's abuse of peremptory strikes.8' Beyond the obvious inequality
of permitting only a defendant to exercise peremptories without su-
pervision, however, the courts' analysis of the legal and policy issues
raised by granting the same right to the prosecutor was minimal. 2
The reasoning applied by the Massachusetts, California and
Florida courts assumes that unless the prosecutor receives a right to
object equal to the defendant's right, a purported constitutional
guarantee to the prosecutor of an "impartial jury" is abridged. Tra-
ditionally, however, the Supreme Court has let the legislature, rather
than the courts, protect the prosecutor's interest in a fair trial.83 The
Supreme Court has held that the peremptory challenge is neither a
common law nor a constitutional right, but is rather a purely statu-
tory one.8' Furthermore, the Court has read the sixth amendment's
"impartial jury" guarantee as primarily protecting the defendant:
The record of English and colonial jurisprudence antedating the
Constitution will be searched in vain for evidence that trial by
78. Id. at -, 427 N.E.2d at 757.
79. Id.
80. Id. at __, 427 N.E.2d at 758.
81. Two states, Massachusetts and California, demoted their original decisions concern-
ing prosecutorial rights to footnotes. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d
748, 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 906; Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, -, 387
N.E.2d 449, 517 n.35.
82. A more provident approach was taken by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky,
106 S. Ct. 1712, 1718 n.12 (1986), wherein the court limited its holding to prosecutorial mis-
use of peremptories and saved the issue of the defendant's abuse of peremptories for another
day.
83. The sixth amendment's text itself supports the concept that it protects defendants,
but not prosecutors. It states that, "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI, § I (empha-
sis added). See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
84. United States v. Shackelford, 59 U.S. 588, 590 (1856).
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jury in criminal cases was regarded as a part of the structure of
government, as distinguished from a right or privilege of the
accused.
In the light of the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude
that the framers of the Constitution simply were intent upon
preserving the right of trial by jury primarily for the protection
of the accused. 85
Courts should therefore recognize that any prosecutorial right to ob-
ject to peremptory abuse may not arise out of a constitutional guar-
antee to an impartial jury because this constitutional guarantee pro-
tects only the defendant. It is rather the duty of the legislature to
protect the state interest in a fair trial. Indeed, except for the rights
of the defendant protected by the Constitution, the duty "to pre-
scribe whatever will tend to secure the impartiality of jurors in crim-
inal cases is not only within the competency of the legislature, but is
among its highest duties . . . .With regard to peremptories, the
whole matter is under [legislative] control.
'86
Such a view does not mean that the Constitution provides no
guarantee to the prosecutor of a fair trial, but rather that a court, in
deciding whether the prosecutor had a fair trial, should defer greatly
to the intent of the legislature.87 Thus, when the legislative body has
granted the defendant an unfettered peremptory challenge, courts
should be reluctant to review this statutory right under the auspices
of guaranteeing the prosecutor a fair trial. 8
Another fundamental difficulty with extension of the sixth
amendment's representative cross section guarantee to prosecutors is
the broad definition of what "identifiable groups" cannot be system-
atically excluded from the jury panel.8 9 Courts have held that jury
panel selection procedures shall not systematically exclude groups
85. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-97 (1929). See also Commonwealth v.
Wharton, 495 Pa. 581, 594, 435 A.2d 158, 164 (1981) (noting that although the defendant
has a constitutional right to trial by jury, the prosecution does not have a commensurate con-
stitutional right to demand a jury.)
86. Hayes, 120 U.S. at 70.
87. This view is consistent with the explanation of heightened judicial scrutiny set forth
by Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Although
prejudice against a criminal defendant may require the court to engage in heightened scrutiny
in order to ensure the impartiality of the jury, the "political processes" may be relied upon to
protect the prosecutor's interest in an impartial jury. Id. at 153 n.4.
88. Of course, state courts interpreting their state constitutions are free to afford greater
protections than those afforded by the United States Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler,
22 Cal. 3d 258, 285, 583 P.2d 748, 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 908 (1978).
89. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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defined by language, 90 race, 91 economic status,' 2 sex,9 and occupa-
tion." These cases, however, provide only a loose framework as to
what constitutes an identifiable group. 9
5
A peremptory challenge, by definition, is based on some unar-
ticulated suspicion of bias, often predicated on the juror's "group"
affiliation. 96 When, for instance, a defense attorney may exclude pro-
spective jurors because they come from the crime victim's neighbor-
hood or from a different economic stratum than the defendant, appli-
cation of the sixth amendment fair cross-section analysis may undo
these challenges. Such broad-based definitions of what comprises a
cognizable group may eviscerate peremptory practice and mark its
demise as an effective device for the defendant to use in securing an
impartial jury.'"
The Massachusetts Soares decision, in order to avoid making
too great an inroad into peremptories, limited the identifiable groups
against which a party may show peremptory misuse to those defined
by sex, race, color, creed or national origin.' 8 The Florida court in
Neil spoke only of the exclusion of a "distinct racial group." 99 Only
California couched its holding in broad terms of the representative
cross section requirement. It recognized peremptory exclusion of any
"cognizable group" as unconstitutional but declined to explain what
constitutes a cognizable group.100
The Massachusetts holding in Soares and the Florida holding in
90. See United States v. Ramos Colon, 415 F. Supp. 459 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1976).
91. See United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 1984).
92. See United States ex rel. Barksdale v. Blackburn, 610 F.2d 253, 272 (5th Cir. 1972)
(exclusion of "wage earners").
93. See Taylor, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
94. See Simmons v. State, 182 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1966).
95. See Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit
Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977).
96. A defendant may, however, object to the exclusion of a group, even though he or she
is not a member of the group. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526. Such broad standing to object distin-
guishes a sixth amendment "representative cross section" from most equal protection cases. Cf.
Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723 (1986), in which the Court required that the
defendant show that the excluded jurors and defendant were members of the same racial
group.
97. The challenges based on nonracial group biases are not nearly as invidious a form of
discrimination as discrimination based on race. Thus, balancing the importance of the peremp-
tory challenge to the defendant against a limitation barring the peremptory from being used to
exclude on any group bias, the importance of the peremptory may prevail. When, however, the
importance of the peremptory is weighed against the detriments of racial discrimination, a
different conclusion may be reached. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).
98. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, -, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (1978).
99. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984).
100. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 38, 280 n.26, 583 P.2d 748, 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
905.
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Neil have been criticized as equal protection cases in the guise of the
sixth amendment. 101 Unless these two state courts reevaluate the ap-
plication of the representative cross section guarantee to the chal-
lenge stage of jury selection, these holdings are subject to extension
to other cognizable groups and to erosion of the artificial limitations
these courts have placed on the grounds for objection. Eventually,
such decisions, if their analysis is permitted to stand, may erode ef-
fective peremptory practice.10 2
IV. Equal Protection: The Proper Approach to Limiting the De-
fendant's Abuse of Peremptories
For over a century, the Supreme Court has invoked the equal
protection clause to protect against racial discrimination in jury se-
lection procedures. 08 In Strauder v. West Virginia,'"' the Court in-
validated a state statute that limited grand and petit jury service to
"all white men who are 20 years of age and who are citizens of this
state."' 1 5 Similarly, the Court in Swain v. Alabama recognized that
use of peremptory challenges was subject to equal protection analy-
sis, yet placed an insurmountable burden of proof upon the defend-
ant who attempted to show peremptory abuse.' 00 It was left to Bat-
son v. Kentucky to allow proof of purposeful discrimination to be
inferred from a single case.
The defendant in Batson, a black man, was charged with bur-
glary and receipt of stolen goods.'0 During jury selection the state
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four blacks
from the venire, leaving an all-white jury. 0 8 The defense counsel
moved to discharge the jury on the grounds that the prosecutor's use
of peremptories had violated the defendant's sixth and fourteenth
101. See Note, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments - The Swain Song of the Racially
Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 77 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821, 840
(1986) [hereinafter Swain Song].
102. A premise of this comment is that only peremptories used for the purposeful dis-
crimination against prospective jurors on the basis of race, color or national origin are so perni-
cious that they should be the subject of judicial review.
103. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) was the Supreme Court's first jury
discrimination case. Typically, in an equal protection case, the complaining party must show a
"class," and must show discrimination against the "class." Racial classes always have been
afforded the greatest protection. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). See
also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (persons of Mexican descent are a class pro-
tected by fourteenth amendment).
104. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
105. Id. at 305.
106. See Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation
of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966).
107. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1715 (1986).
108. Id.
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amendment right to a jury selected from a representative cross-sec-
tion of the community and his fourteenth amendment right to equal
protection of the laws.109 The Kentucky Supreme Court, relying on
Swain, affirmed.110
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
and expressly overruled the "crippling burden" placed on defendants
by Swain. 1 Under the new Batson standards, a defendant could es-
tablish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in petit jury
selection by proving two elements. First, the defendant must show
that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prose-
cutor has exercised peremptories to remove venire members of the
defendant's race.1 12 Second, the defendant can rely on circumstantial
evidence to demonstrate an inference of discriminatory purpose by
the prosecutor.113 Such evidence may take the form of a "pattern" of
strikes against members of the defendant's race or be inferred from
questions and statements during the voir dire." " After the defendant
has presented a prima facie case, the burden falls on the state to
present a neutral explanation of the challenges. 1 '
Although Batson expressly refused to address whether the
United States Constitution limits a defendant's abuse of perempto-
ries, the concurrence of Justice Marshall accepts such a possibility.
In support of his proposal that peremptories should be abolished al-
together, Marshall stated that the
potential for racial prejudice, further, inheres in the defendant's
challenge as well. If the prosecutor's peremptory challenge could
be eliminated only at the cost of eliminating the defendant's
challenge as well, I do not think that would be too great a price
to pay. 116
A curb on the defendant's abuse of peremptories, however, need not
take the drastic form of abolition of the time-honored practice. A
limitation on abuse should still preserve the protections that the pe-
remptory affords. By extension of the Batson test to situations in
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 1720.




116. Id. at 1729. During oral argument, several questions of the Court discussed the
possible application of the equal protection clause to a defendant's abuse of peremptories. See
Batson v. Kentucky, Transcript of Oral Argument, at 8-9, 20, 26 (1986) [hereinafter
Transcript].
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which a defendant of one race seeks to exclude members of another
race, color, or national origin, the test would place defendants on
notice that courts will not tolerate abuse of peremptory challenges.
Furthermore, if circumstances indicate that a defendant has exer-
cised peremptory challenges on racial grounds, a trial judge will be
empowered to take corrective action. 17
An essential element of an equal protection violation is that the
discrimination be "purposeful." 118 A defendant thus can still law-
fully challenge a minority juror, or several minority jurors, on
grounds other than race.119 In such cases, however, a defendant
should be prepared to explain the nonracial reasons for the chal-
lenges. It is this requirement of purposeful discrimination that distin-
guishes an equal protection case from one under the "representative
cross section" requirement of the sixth amendment. Violations of the
sixth amendment are based not only on intentional exclusion but also
on the "systematic exclusion" of a group."' The requirement of
"systematic exclusion" does not properly address the individualized
use of peremptories. It is difficult, for example, to find systematic
exclusion of black jurors when a white defendant asserts a peremp-
tory to exclude the sole black member of the venire."' Such a flaw
does not exist in a challenge to peremptory abuse based on equal
protection grounds. The Supreme Court has recognized that a single
117. The form of remedy may depend upon the jury selection procedure used by the
particular court. A venire member who previously has been advised of his dismissal from the
jury panel by the defendant may carry a grudge against the defendant. In such instances, the
trial judge should not reinstate the prospective juror but should instead dismiss jury members
already selected and the remaining venire and begin jury selection anew. If, however, the pros-
ecutor raises an objection while the prospective juror is ignorant of his dismissal by the defend-
ant, the juror should be reinstated on the jury.
118. See, e.g., Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1717.
119. Such exclusion of jurors on grounds other than race is not "purposeful discrimina-
tion" but merely is incidental to the party's goal of excluding jurors the defendant suspects of
bias, either on individual grounds or for non-racial group bias. The Florida Supreme Court
recognized the potential divergence of concepts between "systematic exclusion" of prospective
jurors and the wrong of peremptory abuse that the court sought to remedy. In situations where
a party peremptorily excludes black jurors on grounds other than race, "it is possible that the
cross-section requirement might have to give way before [the Florida Constitution's] guarantee
of an impartial jury." State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1984).
120. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975). Of course, in some instances, the
exclusion may be both "systematic" and "purposeful." See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503
(1972). Yet, in many situations, the peremptory challenge, given its individualized exercise,
lends itself only to the "purposeful discrimination" analysis. Cf., Transcript, supra note 116, at
26 (members of the Batson court recognized during the argument that the representative cross
section requirement may not curb a single discriminatory act). Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has sidestepped at least one opportunity to extend the sixth amendment "cross section"
requirement to selection procedures for individual jurors. See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1729-31
(Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 1731-33 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
121. But see Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 427 N.E.2d 754
(1981).
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act may violate the equal protection clause:
A consistent pattern of official racial discrimination is [not] a
necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. A single invidious discriminatory government act would
not necessarily be immunized by the absence of such discrimina-
tion in the making of other comparable decisions.12
Furthermore, when a party exercises a series of peremptories against
a racial group for reasons other than race, the exclusion may be
"systematic," even though it is not "purposeful" discrimination.
Thus, the equal protection clause provides a more appropriate basis
by which to address the problem of peremptories executed individu-
ally to exclude a person on the basis of race.12
V. Finding State Action
Whether one scrutinizes a defendant's abuse of peremptory
challenges under the representative cross section requirement of the
sixth amendment or under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment, the United States Constitution demands that the
challenged practice be "state action."124 When the objection is to the
acts of a state prosecutor, as in Batson, the state action is obvious.
When, however, defense counsel excludes jurors through peremptory
challenges on the basis of race, the state has only authorized the
private actor.12 5 The question of state action is therefore a close one.
122. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14 (1977).
123. It should be noted that those states applying the "representative cross section" re-
quirement to peremptory abuse read Swain as precluding an equal protection attack on per-
emptories. Forced to innovate, these states chose the wrong tool for the problem. Since Batson
has overruled Swain, those courts in Massachusetts, Florida, and California that had rejected
the equal protection argument should re-evaluate their decisions.
124. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "No
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § I.
In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth
amendment due process clause incorporates the sixth amendment "fair cross section" require-
ment. Some commentators, however, have inexplicably ignored the state action component of
the "fair cross section" requirement.
125. Generally, courts must address the state action issue when a challenger seeks to
call a private actor's conduct "state action" based on the relationship of the conduct with
government. Clearly, if the private actor's conduct is prohibited by state law, the conduct is
not state action. In contrast, when the state compels the private actor to perform the chal-
lenged conduct, courts will find state action. The close issue arises when the state permits
private conduct which may be discriminatory. See Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis
of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REv. 221 (1977)
[hereinafter Glennon & Nowak]. The defense counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges to
exclude blacks is an example of this third scenario.
If the conduct is deemed state action, it becomes subject to more stringent constitutional
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The law of state action under the fourteenth amendment re-
mains unclear. The Supreme Court has previously recognized that
"to fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state re-
sponsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an 'impossible task'
which 'this Court has never attempted.'"12 Rather, in determining
whether the "nonobvious involvement of the state" is state action
under the fourteenth amendment, a court reaches its conclusion "by
sifting facts and weighing circumstances.
1 27
Courts, while sifting and weighing, typically direct their inquiry
toward three possible scenarios for state action. 1 8 The first scenario
is the "state nexus" approach, under which a court may find that the
number and pervasiveness of the contacts between the conduct of the
private actor and the state are such that the conduct may be called
state action. 1 9 Under the second scenario, known as the "state func-
tion" approach, the conduct of a private actor is state action when
the state has delegated to the private actor a responsibility tradition-
ally belonging to the government."'
Some commentators have proposed that the Supreme Court has
also directed inquiry toward a third approach. This approach, re-
ferred to as "state authorization," is applied when the private actor's
conduct has been supported by the state to such a degree and is so
outweighed by the importance of the right it infringes upon that the
limitations than private action. "Even the Bill of Rights, designed to protect personal liberties,
was directed at rights against governmental authority, not other individuals." United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 771 (1966) (Harlan, J. concurring). See also The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
126. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (quoting Kotch v.
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).
127. Id.
128. See Buchanan, Challenging State Acts of Authorization Under the Fourteenth
Amendment: Suggested Answers to an Uncertain Quest, 57 WASH. L. REV. 245 (1982) [here-
inafter Suggested Answers]; Buchanan, State Authorization. Class Discrimination, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 21 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1984); Glennon & Nowak, supra note 125, at
221.
129. See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (discrimination against blacks by the owner
of a restaurant located in a publicly owned building was held to be state action). See also
Suggested Answers, supra note 128, at 246-49.
130. See Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978); Jackson v. Metropol-
itan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). In Jackson, the Court reviewed both the public
function and state nexus approaches to the state action issue yet found no state action. Jackson
had challenged the termination procedure for nonpayment of bills used by a privately owned
electric utility in York, Pennsylvania. She claimed that the procedure was state action and did
not provide adequate notice consistent with constitutional due process requirements. Id. at 348.
The court rejected the claim that the electric utility was performing public functions, stating
that such duties were not "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the state." Id. at 354. It
also found that the extensive state regulation and monopoly status granted by the state did not
create a nexus, because the state had not authorized the termination procedure. Id. at 358.
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conduct violates the Constitution. "1 Essentially, the court engages in
a balancing test and weighs the value of the infringed individual
right against the importance of the challenged practice. " 2 In its re-
view on the merits, the court may also consider those facts relevant
to "state nexus" and "public function" in weighing the invidiousness
of the infringement resulting from the challenged act. 33 Thus, when
certain "closely scrutinized" rights are infringed, a lesser threshold
of state action may be required of the conduct in order to violate the
fourteenth amendment.
384
When defense counsel selects a jury, his conduct is inextricably
entangled with government. Furthermore, the Constitution tradition-
ally has afforded its greatest protections in areas involving racial
discrimination. "
The jury selection process in the courtroom is a combined effort
of the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney. The proceeding takes
place in the government courtroom and selects a body whose mem-
bers are employed by the state to undertake the important govern-
mental function of adjudicating the defendant's guilt or innocence.
In addition, the state has statutorily authorized the number of per-
emptories given to the defendant. Thus, the entanglement is so great
that the defense counsel's acts in selecting the jury cannot be parti-
tioned from the state criminal justice system of which they are an
essential part.' 6 The conduct of defense counsel in exercising per-
emptories, therefore, should be deemed state action.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the nexus between the state
and defense counsel during jury selection is the public's strong reac-
tion when a defendant excludes prospective jurors on the basis of
131. See supra note 128.
132. The balancing test has been articulated as follows: "If the value of the right clearly
outweighs the value of the challenged practice, the [fourteenth a]mendment proscribes the
practice. If the importance of the right is not clearly greater than that of the challenged prac-
tice the effect of the practice of the right does not violate the Amendment." Glennon & No-
wak, supra note 125, at 231.
133. Suggested Answers, supra note 128, at 249-50.
134. Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state action
found where restaurant discriminating against blacks was located in publicly owned building)
with Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no state action where state statuto-
rily authorizes self-help method of collateral sale).
135. Classes of disadvantaged racial groups are "immediately suspect" and in such in-
stances, the courts will engage in "the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429 (1984).
136. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), in which the Court found that actions
of a privately retained defense counsel, motivated by a conflict of interest, violated the sixth
and fourteenth amendments right to counsel. In addressing the state action issue, the court
noted that the "[sitate's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the State." Id. at 344-45.
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race.137 The Court has noted that "the harm from discriminatory
jury selection extends . . . to touch the entire community. Selection
procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries un-
dermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.""'
Indeed, this public concern in part led California and Massachusetts
to apply to defendants the limitation on abuse of peremptory
challenges. " 9
In weighing the value of a jury selection system free of invidious
race discrimination against the defendant's right to exercise per-
emptories, the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of equal protec-
tion must prevail. " Although history indicates that the peremptory
is primarily a right granted to protect defendants" ' who may need
the challenges more than a prosecutor in order to overcome the
prejudice created by criminal accusation and relatively limited re-
sources1 4 2 and the defendant's stake in the trial is so great that it is
137. Cf. Note, State v. Neil, Approaching the Desired Balance Between Peremptory
Challenges and Racial Equality in Jury Selection, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 777, 796 n.125
(1985), in which the author notes that in the Miami, Florida area, white defendants' abuse of
peremptory challenges had raised the ire of the general public. The public concern centered on
three cases in which white police officers charged with beating or shooting blacks to death were
acquitted by all-white juries. Id.
138. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1718 (1986).
139. The California Supreme Court presented the following example as support for
granting the prosecutor the right of objection:
[W]hen a white defendant is charged with a crime against a black victim,
the black community as a whole has a legitimate interest in participating in the
trial proceedings; that interest will be defeated if the prosecutor does not have
the power to thwart any defense attempt to strike all blacks from the jury on the
ground of group bias alone.
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 907
n.29 (1978).
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also cited the above excerpt from Wheeler to
support its contention that the prosecutor should have the right to object to a defendant's
abuse of peremptories. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, - n.35, 387 N.E.2d 499,
517 n.35 (1979). The court also noted that the government's complaint that the defendants
attempted to strike all veniremen of Italian descent from the jury would, if proven, be a legiti-
mate ground for objection. Id.
140. In Batson, the Supreme Court applied a similar balancing test to weigh the prose-
cutor's right to the peremptory challenge against the defendant's right to equal protection of
the laws. In part, the public interest in the criminal justice system tipped the scales for the
defendant's equal protection rights. The Court explained that:
While we recognize, of course, that the peremptory challenge occupies an
important position in our trial procedures, we do not agree that our decision
today will undermine the contribution the challenge generally makes to the ad-
ministration of justice . . . . In view of the heterogeneous population of our na-
tion, public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be
strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service be-
cause of his race."
Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1724.
141. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
142. According to one study, 25 to 30% of the members of jury pools believe that a
defendant is guilty once he or she is indicted, while only 5% of the jury pool hold animosity
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of great importance that he or she have confidence that the jury will
decide the case impartially, 4 s to bar the defendant from exercising
peremptories on the basis of racial bias represents only a limited in-
trusion on the defendant's strong interest in the challenge.
The opportunity to exercise this peremptory in many other cir-
cumstances remains. This limitation protects the rights of the state
from racial abuse via the state-authorized action of the defense
counsel. More importantly, the limitation protects the interests of
the general public and of venire members of different races to be
considered for the jury without regard to race. These individuals
have a constitutional right to serve as jurors and to be considered for
such duty without regard to race. 14 Limiting the defendant's misuse
of peremptories plugs the last loophole in which racial discrimination
is permitted in judicial procedure, thereby protecting the public in-
terest in a criminal justice system free from racial considerations.
VI. Prosecutorial Standing to Raise the Objection
Peremptory abuse by a defendant injures three distinct parties.
First, there is the injury to the interests of the prosecutor, as the
representative of the state, in a fair jury selection from which minor-
ities have not been purposefully excluded. 45 Second, the general
public, particularly members of the excluded minority, suffer from
the injection by the defendant of racially discriminatory practices
into the jury selection process.' 6 Third, the excluded juror suffers
toward the government. Comment, The Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse
of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1770, 1786-87 (1979).
143. Id. at 1787.
144. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1718.
145. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) recognizes the prosecutor's legitimate interest in a jury trial.
Rule 23 conditions a defendant's waiver of a jury trial upon the "consent of the government."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). In Singer, the Court
notes, "[Tlhe government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which
it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before a tribunal which the Constitution regards
as most likely to produce a fair result." Id. at 36. Rules similar to FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) are
in effect in many states. See Singer, 380 U.S. at 36. The government's legitimate interest,
however, is not protected under the sixth amendment. See supra notes 83-102 and accompany-
ing text.
See also United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984), in which Judge
Posner, in a pre-Batson opinion, noted:
As it cannot be right to believe that racial discrimination is wrong only
when it harms a criminal defendant and not when it harms the law-abiding com-
munity represented by the prosecutor, the prosecutor would be allowed to object
to the defendant's making racial peremptory challenges if the defendant could
object to the prosecutor doing so.
146. The Supreme Court, in Batson, noted the public interest in non-racial jury
selection:
The harm from discriminatory jury selection [by the prosecutor] extends
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from his or her exclusion. 7
Although the prosecutor, as representative of the sovereign, may
find scant protection under the sixth amendment representative cross
section requirement, " 8 he may be dutybound'4 9 on behalf of the ex-
cluded juror and the law-abiding citizens he represents to raise ob-
jections to state-authorized discrimination carried out by the defend-
ant. These interests of individuals are afforded greater protection
under the Constitution than the interests of the state sovereign.150 A
successful assertion of the tertiary rights of the unlawfully excluded
juror, however, may be subjected to the requirements of third party
standing.
The general rule of standing is that a party may raise only his
own rights in mounting a constitutional challenge to official action."5
The rule has been broken down by the Court into both a constitu-
tional requirement and a judicially invented "prudential" limita-
tion.152 The constitutional aspect stems from the article III jurisdic-
tional "case or controversy" requirement. It requires that the
beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire
community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.
Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1718.
147. Id. See also Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970); Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880). All
of these cases note the injury to a wrongfully excluded juror.
148. See supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
149. In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), the Court described the gov-
ernment prosecutor's duty as "the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is . . . that justice shall
be done."
150. See generally D. Doernberg, "We the People": John Locke, Collective Constitu-
tional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52 (1985)
(sovereign is "trustee" rather than beneficiary of the Constitution).
151. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976), in which the mother of a death row
inmate was denied standing to challenge her son's sentence, because the son could represent
adequately his own interest if he so chose. The standing inquiry has been articulated as
whether "a party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial
resolution of the controversy." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972).
For a general discussion of third party standing, see M. Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of
Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35
U. MIAMI L. REV. 393 (1981).
152. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498 (1975).
153. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), the Court stated that
Art. Ill requires the party who invokes the court's authority to "show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the puta-
tively illegal conduct of the defendant," . . . and that the injury "fairly can be
traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision."
Id. at 472 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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party suffer "injury in fact."'154 The court-created aspect of the rule
asks "whether, as a prudential matter, the [complaining parties] are
the proper proponents of the particular legal rights on which they
base their suit."'1 55 While the article III "case or controversy" re-
quirement does not bar third party assertion of constitutional rights,
the Court often invokes its prudential standing doctrine in cases of
third party standing. 5 '
The Supreme Court has explained its rule against third party
standing as a "salutary rule," but subject to exceptions."" Thus,
when a majority of the Court believes that the merits of the petition
should be addressed, the hurdle of standing is overcome. In Single-
ton v. Wulff,"" Justice Blackmun explained two factors the court
may consider in deciding whether to grant third party standing. The
first consideration is
the relationship of the litigant to the person whose right he seeks
to assert. If the enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up
with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue, the court at least
can be sure that its construction of the right is not unnecessary
in the sense that the right's enjoyment will be unaffected by the
outcome of the suit. Furthermore, the relationship between the
litigant and the third party may be such that the former is fully,
or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the rights as the
154. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 112.
155. Id. The Court occasionally treats the two aspects of the rule as a unitary test for
standing. See e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), in which standing is described as
having "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the prosecution of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Id.
156. See Wulff, 428 U.S. at 113-14. See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
157. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953). In Barrows, the Court was asked to
decide the issue of whether a white landowner who had sold property to a black in violation of
a deed covenant could raise the constitutional rights of the buyer as a defense in a damages
action by the beneficiaries of the covenant. Speaking for the Court, Justice Minton described
by rationale for the relaxation of the rule against third party standing as
a salutary rule, the validity of which we reaffirm. But in the instant case, we are
faced with a unique situation in which it is the action of the state court which
might result in a denial of constitutional rights and in which it would be difficult
if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their griev-
ance before any court. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe
the reasons which underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights,
which is only a rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the funda-
mental rights which would be denied by permitting the damages action to be
maintained.
Id.
158. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
latter.ss
Second, the court examines
the ability of the third party to assert his own right. Even where
the relationship is close, the reasons for requiring persons to as-
sert their own rights will generally still apply. If there is some
genuine obstacle to such assertion, however, the third party's ab-
sence from court loses its tendency to suggest that his right is
not truly at stake, or truly important to him, and the party who
is in court becomes by default the right's best available
proponent. 6 '
Some commentators suggest that the Court actually considers four
factors when presented with a third party standing issue: the interest
of the litigant; the nature of the right asserted; the relationship of
the litigant and the third party whose rights the litigant asserts; and
finally, the ability of those third parties to assert independently their
rights."" The third and fourth elements of this test mirror those set
forth in Singleton.
The prosecutor as sovereign and as participant in the trial has a
dependent relationship with the prospective jury members, some of
whom will serve as arbiters of his presentation of the case. By the
defendant's exclusion of prospective jurors because of race, the de-
fendant interferes with that relationship by exercising an unconstitu-
tional selection process.' Additionally, it is highly unlikely that a
venire member, peremptorily excluded by a defendant, would assert
his or her own right to be considered for the jury without regard to
race. Since the grounds for peremptory challenges are not explicitly
revealed, a prospective juror may be entirely unaware of the discrim-
ination, either because the juror was not present for the "'pattern' of
strikes" " evidencing purposeful discrimination, or because the ju-
159. Id. at 114-15.
160. Id. at 115-16.
161. R. Sedler, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71
YALE L.J. 599, 627 (1962).
162. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the Supreme Court was faced with the
issue of whether a trial court could consider the probable public prejudice against an interra-
cial marriage in deciding a child custody case. After noting the "reality" of prejudice where a
child lives with a stepparent of another race, the Court stated that
the question, however, is whether the reality of private biases and the possible
injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for removal of an infant
child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty concluding
that they are not. The Constitution cannot control prejudices but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.
Id. at 433 (footnote omitted).
163. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723 (1986).
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ror's attention to the issue was not as great as the watchful eyes of
the adversarial prosecutor. Unless the right of objection is granted to
the prosecutor, a defendant's exercise of peremptories will perpetuate
"discrimination within the judicial system [which] is most
pernicious."' 4
VII. Conclusion
The peremptory challenge plays an important role in protecting
the rights of defendants in the American criminal justice system.
When, however, defendants exercise peremptories to exclude pro-
spective jurors on the basis of race, color, or national origin, the ac-
tion taints the entire justice system with invidious discrimination.
Courts, therefore, must find a logical means of addressing the de-
fendant's abuse of peremptory challenges. Whereas Massachusetts,
California and Florida have invoked the representative cross section
requirement of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to limit pe-
remptory abuse by both prosecutors and defendants, a more logical
answer to the problem is found under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. An equal protection limitation upon de-
fendants is especially desirable now that the Supreme Court has in-
voked the clause to limit a prosecutor's abuse of peremptories. Cer-
tain problems still will remain. 65 Nevertheless this solution provides
the best balance between preservation of the peremptory as a means
of achieving a fair trial, and this nation's strong interest in prevent-
ing racial discrimination from invading the courtroom.
Michael Sullivan
164. Id. at 1718.
165. In one foreseeable scenario, a black defendant may exercise peremptory challenges
against white prospective jurors in order to reach the few black members of a jury venire. See,
e.g., People v. Gary M., 138 Misc.2d 1081, 526 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1988) (counsel for black de-
fendant excluded white prospective jurors). Arguably, this is not the type of discrimination
which the fourteenth amendment was designed to remedy, nor is it as invidious as other types
of discrimination. Compare United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (heightened judicial scrutiny is applied when "discrete and insular minorities" are in-
volved) with University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-94, 361-62 (1978)
(amendment requires heightened scrutiny of all forms of racial classifications).
